This contribution considers the Constitutional Court of South Africa's judgments regarding aspects of sentencing. It starts with an overview of relevant judgments, before attending in more detail to judgments on the minimum sentences legislation and on sentencing when it affects children. On this foundation, the article then discusses the human rights that are affected by the imposition of sentences on offenders, before attempting to identify what the next instalment of Constitutional Court judgments might bring to the sentencing table.
Introduction
In 2015 it was 20 years since the official opening of the Constitutional Court in South Africa. 1 This was a significant milestone in the Court's history. Although not a dominant theme, some of the court's judgments directly influenced sentencing theory and practices. Some of the judgments had a profound influence on the development of constitutional jurisprudence and the new constitutional order.
This contribution considers the Constitutional Court's judgments regarding aspects of sentencing. It starts with an overview of relevant judgments, before attending in more detail to judgments on the minimum sentences legislation and on sentencing when it affects children. On this foundation, the article then discusses the human rights that are affected by the imposition of sentences on offenders, before attempting to identify what the next instalment of Constitutional Court judgments might bring to the sentencing table.
It is worth noting what this article is not intended to do. It does not attempt a major discussion of any specific aspect of sentencing, such as minimum sentences or the sentencing of child offenders. It is a collection and collation of judgments that share one common element, namely that they have something to say about an aspect of sentencing. The value of such an approach is that it provides the first step to answering the following question: The Constitutional Court has been active for 20 years; what do we learn about sentencing from its judgments during this time? 2
Overview of judgments
The Constitutional Court's earliest pronouncements on sentencing considered the constitutionality of a specific kind of sentence. In short succession the Court declared unconstitutional the death penalty, in S v Makwanyane, 3 and corporal punishment for juvenile offenders, in S v Williams. 4 No other sentence has been declared unconstitutional since this same judges, giving judgment only three days apart. 15 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (hereafter the interim Constitution) made no mention of either the death penalty or corporal punishment and the Court had to consider the complete context of the Bill of Rights in the process of determining the constitutionality of these sentences. In the process it touched upon many topics such as constitutional interpretation in general, the influence of foreign sources, the content and interpretation of various rights and, finally, the limitation clause. 16 As others have commented on these judgments in detail, there is little need to add to those discussions here. However, I return to them when discussing the human rights affected by sentencing.
Developments since Makwanyane

Minimum sentences legislation
It is convenient to set out briefly the history of the minimum sentences legislation. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (hereafter the Act) came into operation in May 1998. 17 Before this happened, sentencing was almost exclusively within the discretion of the courts, subject to maxima contained in statutory penalty clauses. The Act introduced minimum sentences for a large number of the more serious crimes. It was originally intended as a temporary measure, 18 but has since become permanent. 19 The Act applies to adult offenders convicted of any of the offences listed in Schedule 2. This schedule lists a substantial number of offences in four categories (or parts) of roughly descending severity. In terms of section 51(1) of the Act, life imprisonment is prescribed for the offences contained in part I of Schedule 2. Essentially this includes aggravated forms of murder and rape. The constitutionality of section 51(1) was the subject of the judgment in S v Dodo. 20 Section 51(2) prescribes minimum sentences for the offences listed in the other parts to Schedule 2, starting at 15 years' imprisonment 21 and decreasing to 5 years' imprisonment. 22 Increased 15 On 6 and 9 June 1995 respectively. minimum sentences apply when the offender has previous convictions. 23 Importantly, the sentencing courts are permitted to depart from the prescribed sentences when a reduced sentence is justified by "substantial and compelling circumstances". 24 Originally, regional courts had the power to impose any of the minimum periods of imprisonment, even if such a sentence exceeded the regional courts' general jurisdiction. 25 However, when life imprisonment was prescribed, the case had to be committed for sentencing to a high court. 26 The referral process caused severe delays in the finalisation of cases, 27 came under heavy criticism for this reason, and resulted in the first consideration of the minimum sentences by the Constitutional Court.
The Constitutional Court and minimum sentences
In S v Dzukuda 28 the Court considered whether the referral process was constitutional or not. 29 Its findings are contained in the following summary: 30 Contrary to the findings in the court a quo, the Constitutional Court found that a sentencing court does not have to be in a position identical to that of the trial court, that there is nothing in section 52 that prevents the High Court from obtaining all the information necessary to enable it to impose sentence, and that any inadequacies in the trial-court record can be corrected by the obtaining of such information in the same way as the sentencing court.
Importantly, the Court stressed 31 that no …provision in s 52, requires a High Court to act in a way which would impinge on an accused's right to a fair trial. It is for the High Court, in each case committed to it under s 52 for sentence, to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial and nothing in the section prevents the High Court from doing so.
With this finding, the Court placed the responsibility of ensuring that the trial remains fair, firmly in the hands of the courts.
23
The detail of these provisions is discussed in Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (3) 49-91. 24 Section 51(3) of the Act. In its second judgment on this legislation, S v Dodo, 32 the Court was called upon to consider the validity of section 51(1), the provision that prescribes life imprisonment. The judgment followed within a few weeks of the judgment in S v Malgas, 33 where the Supreme Court of Appeal considered the minimum sentences legislation in considerable detail, and particularly with respect to the "substantial and compelling circumstances" departure clause. 34 Dodo fully endorsed Malgas's interpretation of the words "substantial and compelling circumstances", quoting the summary of the judgment in Malgas 35 verbatim and holding this to be "a practical method" of dealing with the minimum sentences. 36 The essence of the summary in Malgas is the following: 37  Courts should ordinarily impose the prescribed sentences.

The legislature "deliberately left it to the courts" to determine whether circumstances justify departure. All traditionally relevant factors have to be taken into account in this process.
Departure is permissible only when there are "truly convincing reasons" for so departing. 38 If the prescribed sentence would be unjust, in being disproportionate to the crime, the offender and the needs of society, "so that an injustice would be done by imposing that sentence", 39 the court may depart.
The result will be a "standardised response" 40 with consistently more severe sentences.
The Court concluded in Dodo 41 that section 51(1) was not unconstitutional, as it "does not compel the court to act inconsistently with the Constitution". 
The minimum sentences and separation of powers
The high court in S v Dodo, 42 in finding that section 51(1) was unconstitutional, held that the legislature had gone too far in prescribing the minimum sentences. It found that this provision "undermine[d] the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary" 43 and that, especially life imprisonment, "the most severe penalty open to the High Court", is something that "falls within the heartland of the judicial power, and is not to be usurped by the Legislature". 44 The Constitutional Court disagreed with this assessment.
Stripped to its bare bones, the separation of powers "…requires the functions of government to be classified as either legislative, executive or judicial and requires each function to be performed by separate branches of government". 45 The Constitutional Court accepted that the legislature has a legitimate interest in the nature and severity of sentences in South Africa. 46 After all, the legislature has always been involved in creating offences and prescribing the sentences for such offences. 47 With the prescription of minimum sentences, because of the departure clause, the legislature had not forced the courts to act in violation of the Constitution, as noted above.
However, there are limits to what the legislature can prescribe with respect to sentences. The imposition of an appropriate sentence in a specific instance on an individual offender, the Constitutional Court explained, is undoubtedly the domain of the judicial power: 48
In the field of sentencing, however, it can be stated as a matter of principle that the legislature ought not to oblige the judiciary to impose a punishment which is wholly lacking in proportionality to the crime. This would be inimical to the rule of law and the constitutional state. It would a fortiori be so if the legislature obliged the judiciary to pass a sentence which was inconsistent with the … Bill of Rights.
Amendment of the legislation and subsequent judgments
In an attempt to alleviate some of the criticism of the Act, the legislature amended it in 2007. 49 Arguably, the most dramatic amendment was to give regional courts the power to impose life imprisonment when it was prescribed by section 51(1). Some of the other amendments include the following:
 The legislation became permanent, as the amendment removed the renewal requirement.

The position of children of 16 and 17 years old was changed. This amendment is discussed below.
These amendments mean that the Act is now substantially different from the legislation considered constitutional in Dodo. There is little reason, therefore, to accept that Dodo is the Constitutional Court's final word on the constitutionality of the Act.
Children and sentencing
Introduction
The inclusion in the Constitution of specific rights for children opened a new chapter in the development of children's rights, both generally and specifically when children intersect with the criminal justice system. 50 In particular the Constitution establishes the best-interests-of-the-child principle, 51 as well as the principles that imprisonment should be a last resort and, when imposed as a last resort, should be for the shortest appropriate term. 52 The essence of the new chapter is that children are different from adults. 53 They are different for the following reasons, highlighted in Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice: 54  Physical vulnerability: Children's bodies are "generally frailer", leaving them less "able to protect themselves" and more in need of protection; they are "less resourceful in self-maintenance". constricted"; their "as yet unformed character" leaves then more prone to impulsive decisions.

They have a greater capaity for rehabilitation.
Specifically relevant to sentencing, the crux of the matter is the following: 55 We recognise that exacting full moral accountability for a misdeed might be too harsh because they are not yet adults. Hence we afford children some leeway of hope and possibility.
Children and minimum sentences
When the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 was originally passed, the minimum sentences appeared also to apply to children aged 16 and 17 years at the time of the offence. The main (only) difference was that section 51(3)(b) required the court to record its reasons for applying the minimum sentences to such a child. This provision was "the object of a remarkable range of judgments". 56 The reference to the Zinn triad 72 indicated that the Court would consider the general principles of sentencing. In effect, the Court found them to be acceptable from a constitutional perspective.
When it appears or is alleged that the offender in a specific case is taking care of a child, the obvious first issue is to determine whether the offender is a "primary caregiver". 73 The Court explained that 74 a primary caregiver is the person with whom the child lives and who performs everyday tasks like ensuring that the child is fed and looked after and that the child attends school regularly.
The Court then concluded, considering its own jurisprudence on the bestinterests-of-the-child standard, 75 that it is a right that can be limited, particularly with regard to its relationship with other rights. 76 How then, should a sentencing court give the best interests of the child their rightful place when sentencing a child's caregiver? In answering this question, 77 the court advised that it should be "a standard preoccupation" of sentencing courts to find a balance among all the different interests involved. If necessary, sentencers need to change their current mind-set, because the children need focussed attention whenever their interests arise during the sentencing process. However, the general approach that courts are expected to take when determining an appropriate sentence remains the approach established in Zinn, namely that the sentence is determined with reference to "the triad consisting of the crime, the offender and the interests of society". 78 When the offender is a primary caregiver of any children these general principles should be applied in accordance with the following "guidelines": a) If the general approach ("the Zinn-triad approach") indicates that "the appropriate sentence is clearly custodial", the court must ensure that the children are cared for, through some alternative means. 79 b) If a non-custodial sentence is "clearly" appropriate, the court must take into account the interests of the children when determining the detail of such a sentence. 80 c) If the appropriate sentence is not clearly either custodial or noncustodial, then the best interests of the children standard becomes an important guiding principle in determining the sentence to impose. 81 In terms of these guidelines, therefore, the interests of the children become an independent sentencing factor only when the application of the triad of Zinn does not clearly indicate whether the appropriate sentence is either custodial or non-custodial. 82 Sachs J also believed that these guidelines would "promote uniformity of principle, consistency of treatment and individualisation of outcome". 83
The Court followed this theoretical assessment with a practical determination of the appropriate sentence in this case. It considered the aggravating features: that M was a repeat offender who deliberately defrauded different retailers with a third party's credit card, over a period of time, with greed as the motive. 84 The Court then confirmed the sentence of four years' imprisonment, but suspended 45 months thereof, in the process ensuring M's immediate release. In addition, it imposed three years' correctional supervision, including conditions such as that M had to perform community service, repay the victims, and undergo regular counselling.
The judgment prompted many positive responses. One such response was that 85
S v M has revolutionised sentencing in cases where the person convicted is the primary caregiver of young children. It has reasserted the central role of the interests of young children as an independent consideration in the sentencing process. In practice the belief of Sachs J that the guidelines would promote consistency was probably too optimistic. Sometimes these guidelines have simply been ignored. 86 In other cases the sentencing court decided that imprisonment was unavoidable because of the seriousness of the crime. 87
This is also one of the rare instances where the Court found it necessary, within a few years only, to provide further guidance through a similar case.
In MS v S 88 the Court imposed a very different sentence from that imposed in S v M, based on the facts of the case. It is really not clear what these distinguishing facts were. 89
Conclusion
With these judgments the Constitutional Court brought some clarity to the sentencing of child offenders, with a heavy emphasis on the need to treat child offenders differently from adults and for courts to take the best interests of children seriously. Much room remain for these considerations to make an impact on sentencing practices in our child justice courts.
Important human rights connected to sentencing
The focus of this contribution now needs to shift to the connection between sentencing and specific human rights. Two of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, which were also considered in S v Makwanyane, 90 are of particular importance to sentencing in general. These are the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, and the right to dignity.
Cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment
Section 11(2) of the Interim Constitution prohibited "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". 91 The wording of the Constitution is slightly different, 92 in that section 12 first establishes the right to freedom and security of the person, and then includes, within this right, the "right not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way". 93 The question is whether these changes make any material difference. As is indicated in what follows, the answer is almost certainly in the negative.
Freedom
Despite freedom's being the broader right protected by section 12(1) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has not really deliberated on this right in its assessment of what amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. Freedom clearly is important in the realm of sentencing, because any form of detention inevitably infringes upon the right to be free. 94 Infringement upon the right to freedom is easily justified when such infringement follows the commission of a crime. However, such justification should be subject to the principles that apply to any limitation of rights, as discussed below. This scrutiny has been absent from our courts' discussions of section 12.
Cruel, inhuman, degrading
General
The Constitutional Court itself noted that the wording of the provisions in the interim Constitution and the Constitution prohibiting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is essentially the same. 95 One consequence of this concession is that judgments on the Interim Constitution remain valid despite the slightly different wording of the final Constitution. Thus, in S v Williams, 96 the Court held that the prohibition should be read "disjunctively", 97 involving the following seven "modes of conduct": "torture; cruel treatment; inhuman treatment; degrading treatment; cruel punishment; inhuman punishment and degrading punishment". The Court gave its most detailed discussion of the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment in S v Dodo. 101 In particular, it linked the prohibited punishment to two constitutional principles, namely those of proportionality and of dignity. Since dignity is itself a constitutional right, it is discussed below, 102 while proportionality is considered next.
Proportionality
The importance of proportionality within the current enquiry is explained as follows in S v Dodo: 103
The concept of proportionality goes to the heart of the inquiry as to whether punishment is cruel, inhuman or degrading, particularly where, as here, it is almost exclusively the length of time for which an offender is sentenced that is in issue.
Why would proportionality go "to the heart of the inquiry"? The logic runs as follows. 104 In terms of section 12(1)(a) of the Constitution a person may "not to be deprived of freedom ... without just cause". When a crime is committed, it provides the "just cause" to deprive the offender of his freedom. However, not every crime justifies the deprivation of liberty. This happens only when such deprivation is "reasonably necessary to curb the offence and punish the offender", having regard to all the personal and other factors "which could have a bearing on the seriousness of the offence and the culpability of the offender". This means that "the length of punishment must be proportionate to the offence".
This explanation in Dodo can be seen as a statement of the constitutional proportionality requirement for sentencing. Since it directly refers to the seriousness of the crime and the culpability of the offender, the question arises whether it is fundamentally different from the trite sentencing principles established in S v Zinn. 105 Notable differences include that Dodo does not refer explicitly to the interests of society, and that the personal "and other" circumstances appear to be limited to those with a "bearing on the seriousness of the offence and the culpability of the offender". 106 Focussing on the "seriousness of the crime" (Dodo) is certainly more specific than just "the crime" (Zinn), as is "the culpability of the offender" when compared with para 95) concluded that the death penalty was cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment; also see Mahomed J paras 277-281. Also see Milton et al 1995 SACJ 195-197 The criterion which is applied to determine whether a mandatory minimum punishment is cruel and unusual is 'whether the punishment prescribed is so excessive as to outrage standards of decency;' the 'effect of that punishment must not be grossly disproportionate to what would have been appropriate'.
Dodo also includes several examples of cases in which the North American courts have held the prescribed sentences not to be grossly disproportionate. Here, however, Ackermann J noted that none of these references should be understood as "agreement … with the application of the gross disproportionality test to the legislation or facts in such decision". 114 This is an important qualification, as the approaches followed in one country might give a totally foreign outcome to "standards of decency" in another. 115 The gross proportionality standards in the USA and Canada are neither simple, nor equal in practical application, nor fixed in time. In Lloyd the Court declared unconstitutional a provision prescribing a minimum sentence of one year's imprisonment for "trafficking or possession for the purpose of trafficking" of certain drugs, if the offender had had another drug conviction within the previous ten years. It is worth repeating that the prescribed sentence found to be unconstitutional was a sentence of one year's imprisonment. The Court's finding was based on the principle established in Nur 126 that a law violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment if (1) "it imposes a grossly disproportionate sentence on the individual before the court", or (2) it "will impose grossly disproportionate sentences on others" when "reasonably foreseeable applications" are considered. 127 In other words, the Court considered not only the facts of the case before it but also the proportionality of the minimum sentence in other scenarios that could reasonably be foreseen. The Court added that, 128
… mandatory minimum sentences that, as here, apply to offences that can be committed in various ways, under a broad array of circumstances and by a wide range of people are vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
The final words apply to South African minimum sentences too.
To conclude this discussion: Although the same words are used to determine the constitutionality of prescribed sentences in the USA and Canada, the practice is so different that these words are almost meaningless. In particular, when comparisons are made with the sentences imposed in the USA, it is important to realise that punishment in the USA tends to be much harsher than in most other countries with a constitutional dispensation. 129
In conclusion: cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment
Many questions remain about proportionality and sentencing, and it remains unknown how the Constitutional Court will apply the grossly disproportionate standard. to be imposed by our courts and required by the legislature, these questions might well have to be answered in the not too distant future.
Dignity
Dignity is ensconced in the Constitution where it declares that "Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected." 130 It is barely possible to overstate its importance. 131 From the many examples that could be quoted, the Constitutional Court noted in Mayelane v Ngwenyama 132 that the right to dignity is "the most important of all human rights, and the source of all other personal rights". In relation to criminal law, dignity has been described as a "foundational value", being at the foundation of rights such as freedom and physical integrity. 133 Dignity is also closely related to the prohibition against cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. Ackermann J wrote in S v Dodo 134 that "the impairment of human dignity … must be involved in all three" of these adjectives. 135 Specifically on the proportionality between the crime and the sentence, Ackermann J continued that not to consider such proportionality would be "… to ignore, if not to deny, that which lies at the very heart of human dignity". 136 It is submitted that the imposition of any sentence tends to impact the dignity of the person punished. 137 If this submission is debatable, it is at least clear that, logically, the prohibition against "degrading" punishment is inseparable from the right to have even offenders' dignity protected and respected.
130
Section 10 of the Constitution.
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This is true even of S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) where dignity played a secondary role in the court's decision (see Kende 2006 Geo Wash Int'l L Rev 223; Freedman 1995 SACJ 197-202 Dignity gains prominence with any long sentence. 138 Long prison sentences are often justified by their supposed deterrent effect. 139 In S v Dodo 140 the Court warned that, when "the length of a sentence … bears no relation to the gravity of the offence", because of an attempt to add a deterrent effect, "… the offender is being used essentially as a means to another end and the offender's dignity assailed". In contrast, dignity reminds us that human beings have "inherent and infinite worth" and cannot be used "as means to an end". 141
Exemplary sentences are, therefore, constitutionally problematic. 142 While it is clear that sentences cannot just be increased for their supposed deterrent effect, as if there were no constitutional consequences, it remains an open question in our law where the line should be drawn or where the tipping point would be reached.
Limitation clause
Overview and application to sentencing
It is already trite that the infringement upon a right is only part of the constitutional issue, as it also needs to be established whether such a limitation might not be constitutionally acceptable. Legislation prescribing a sentence might infringe upon rights such as dignity and the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, but such an infringement will not be unconstitutional if proven to be justified. The principle that no human being should ever be treated as a mere object is also known as the "Kantian" view of dignity -see Ackermann Human Dignity 100-101. In determining whether a limitation is reasonable and justifiable within the meaning of s 36 of the Constitution, 'it is necessary to weigh the extent of the limitation of the right, on the one hand, with the purpose, importance and effect of the infringing provision on the other, taking into account the availability of less restrictive means to achieve this purpose'.
The balancing requirement of proportionality
As noted above, the limitation assessment involves a proportionality requirement, which requires a balancing of various relevant considerations. According to Makwanyane 148 this process includes … the nature of the right that is limited, and its importance to an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy, and particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other means less damaging to the right in question.
The sentencing of offenders lends itself well to the notion of more or less damaging measures. In Barrie's assessment, the court in Makwanyane "saw the effects of the death penalty as too drastic and saw life imprisonment as a less restrictive means which would achieve the same purpose". 149 More generally, the "less restrictive means to achieve the purpose" requirement means that "a less restrictive but equally effective form of punishment" must be imposed, if available in a specific case, 150 because "a law which invades rights more than is necessary to achieve its purpose is disproportionate". 151 It is clear that the "proportionality" noted in the limitations assessment is substantially different from the "proportionality" required between the crime and the sentence. 152 The risk when using the same term for different concepts is that clarity is easily lost. Interestingly, and perhaps ironically, the Constitutional Court has not addressed this issue, nor has it really been called upon to do so. (20) 22 did not involve the second phase, as no infringement was found to have occurred. 153 Apart from S v Dodo, 154 proportionality as a sentencing requirement has not been considered in detail in any other case, with the result that the Court has so far been able to avoid the need to carefully address both forms of proportionality in one case. 155
Practical examples of the limitation clause regarding sentencing
In Makwanyane and Williams it was clear that rights were violated, including important rights such as life and dignity. 156 The respondent in Makwanyane offered as justification the fact that public opinion supported the death penalty, as well as all the purposes of punishment. These purposes of punishment include retribution, deterrence and incapacitation. However, the respondent could not provide sufficient data to satisfy the court that these reasons could justify the retention of the death penalty, especially given the availability of life imprisonment as "a severe alternative punishment", compared to the "destruction of life and dignity" involved in the death penalty. 157 Similar arguments were offered in S v Williams. 158 The state argued that corporal punishment was justified, on the one hand, as a practical solution to the limited alternative options and shortage of resources and, on the other hand, as a deterrent. 159 The court rejected these arguments. First, it showed that significant alternative measures existed, 160 and found that the state failed to show that the deterrent effect of corporal punishment was significantly stronger than the deterrent effect of these other measures. 161 In Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice 162 the government argued that the minimum sentences legislation needed to apply to 16 and 17 year olds because of the harm caused by their crimes, which would be offset by these sentences. 163 Life and dignity are "values of the highest order" and an infringement can only be justified given "a clear and convincing case" (S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 111 Chaskalson P) or, the infringement must be "manifestly reasonable" (para 210 Kriegler J).
facts to support these arguments. 164 It was finally rejected since "high crime levels and well-justified public anger do not provide justification for a legislative intervention overriding a specific protection in the Bill of Rights". 165 These findings induce us to ask whether there could ever be a justification for a law that amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. The view of Ferreira and Steyn 166 that "cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment of necessity constitutes an unreasonable and unjustifiable limitation of the fundamental rights of the offender in terms of section 36" might well prove to be correct.
In terms of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms a violation of its rights can also be justified. 167 Given the guidance that the Constitutional Court has already obtained from Canadian cases in determining the constitutionality of South African legislation, 168 it is useful to consider how the Canadian Supreme Court has dealt with the current issue. In R v Lloyd 169 it held as follows, before declaring unconstitutional a sentence of one year's imprisonment for dealing in certain drugs: although combatting drug dealing is an important objective, and although there is a rational connection between this objective and the prescribed sentence, the 170 … Crown has not established that less harmful means to achieve Parliament's objective of combatting the distribution of illicit drugs, whether by narrowing the reach of the law or by providing for judicial discretion in exceptional cases, were not available. Nor has it shown that the impact of the limit on offenders deprived of their rights is proportionate to the good flowing from their inclusion in the law.
Even though the minimum sentence was one of only one year's imprisonment, and the crime quite serious, the Court still required of the state to show that the legislative measures would be functional.
The limitation clause: conclusion
The Constitutional Court is yet to find a sentencing provision that violates human rights to be constitutionally justified. 6 Future developments related to sentencing
Introduction
The discussion above highlights certain areas that have either not received any attention, or insufficient attention, from the Constitutional Court. These can be summarised as follows:

The right to freedom of the person, as the foundation of the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, needs to be incorporated into discussions of the constitutionality of longer prison sentences.
 An explicit discussion of the relationship between the principles for a proportionate sentence, as formulated in S v Dodo, 171 and the traditional triad of elements that determine an appropriate sentence, as phrased in S v Zinn, 172 would add a lot of value to the Court's sentencing jurisprudence.
Further development is still possible in connection with the meaning of "cruel, inhuman or degrading". Such further development might well show that the words "cruel" and "inhuman" are virtual synonyms, but that "degrading" is substantively different. After all, the connection between degrading punishment and the concept of dignity is immediately apparent, whereas this is not necessarily the case with cruel and inhuman punishment.
The "gross disproportionality standard" and its connection with North American laws need further clarification. Until this has been done, the grossly disproportionate standard is not useful for South African purposes.
 Uncertainty remains as to whether a sentence that violates the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment could then be justified in terms of the limitations clause.
It is submitted that the minimum sentences legislation is the closest to being unconstitutional of any statutorily regulated aspect of sentencing and, therefore, a probable candidate for a next constitutional challenge. Several of the above-mentioned areas needing clarification would require attention in determining the continued constitutionality of this legislation. 
Minimum sentences legislation
Since the constitutionality of this legislation has already been considered in S v Dodo, 173 one first needs to establish why a reconsideration might be on the cards.
The legislation has been amended
The first point is that the current minimum sentences legislation is not the same as that considered by Dodo. As noted in paragraph 4.1.4 above, following the amendment in 2007 it now contains several further troublesome elements. The following two are possibly the most troublesome of these. 
Looking beyond the prescribed life imprisonment
Dodo considered only the validity of section 51(1), prescribing life imprisonment. It did not consider the other provisions, and it did not consider the logic of the legislation internally -in other words, it did not consider how the severity of the prescribed sentences relates to the objective gravity of the different offences in comparison with one another.
The point is that the minimum sentences legislation contains just four sentences for a broad array of the most serious crimes that can be committed in terms of our criminal law: imprisonment for life, for 15 years, 10 years and 5 years. 181 It also contains several inexplicable inconsistencies, with the sentencing "cliffs" for rape a particularly notable example: 182 when accompanied by one of the aggravating features noted in Part I of Schedule 1, the sentence is life imprisonment; without such a feature, the point of departure 183 is a minimum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment. 184 Courts follow a rather different approach when sentencing. They have to carefully individualise their sentences by considering all the factors relevant to the matter, in particular those mitigating or aggravating the crime and those that affect the culpability of the offender. 185 To this end courts are endowed with a wide discretion, because every case is unique 186 and the sentence has to cater for each important unique feature of the 179 See De See R v Lloyd 2016 1 SCR 130, as discussed in para 5.1.2.3 above.
181
That there are increases when previous convictions are present (s 51(2) of the Act) does not change the position that in essence the legislation imposes only these four sentences. (20) 27 case. 187 The resultant sentences also typically show that crime seriousness is properly reflected, not in a graph of four bars, but in a line that starts close to zero and smoothly rises to cater for even small increases in gravity. When the sentencing discretion is left with the courts, they impose sentences, for example in the case of murder, ranging from "detention until the rising of the court" 188 through correctional supervision 189 and totally suspended sentences, to imprisonment of every imaginable duration up to life imprisonment.
The courts also have to explain why they impose a specific sentence, and how they decided on the duration of the sentence. This requirement "has long been recognised", and is demanded by the interests of justice The court then referred to several cases in which the importance of a judgment is stressed as being "clearly in the interest of justice". 192 Specifically with respect to sentencing, the court quoted with clear approval 193 the following from S v Immelman: 194 It seems to me that, with regard to the sentence of the Court in cases where the trial Judge enjoys a discretion, a statement of the reasons which move him to impose the sentence which he does also serves the interests of justice. Maake closed this aspect by noting that legislation requires both "superior" and magistrates' courts to give reasons for their decisions about the law or the facts. 195 None of these considerations are satisfied when legislation prescribes sentences without giving reasons and without any explanation for the periods of imprisonment it prescribes.
Although the Constitutional Court considered the separation of powers in Dodo and concluded that parliament has an interest in the nature and duration of sentences that are imposed, it did not consider the arguments advanced above. In particular, it did not consider the inequality that results from the status quo, where the legislation imposed terms of imprisonment without any explanation or justification, while courts imposing sentence have to explain every fine detail thereof; nor the fact that the interests of justice inevitably suffer in the absence of such an explanation. The interests of justice also suffer because of the high benchmarks in the minimum sentences legislation. As noted by Scurry Baehr, 196 instead of using the language of aggravation to increase the sentence for serious instances of these crimes, the high starting points force the courts to employ the language of mitigation to get to a lower (proportional) sentence.
Even when the minimum sentences are found to violate certain rights, the justification of such infringements will have to be considered as well. Given the relative harshness of the prescribed sentences, combined with the temporary nature of the legislation, it has generally been agreed that it is the main aim of the Act to combat crime; in other words, to serve as a deterrent. 197 Recently it appears as if sentencing consistency is also considered an important objective, 198 
Concluding remarks
It is appropriate to return to the question posed in the introduction to this contribution. What do we learn about sentencing from the Constitutional Court's judgments of the past 20 years?
Ironically, there is less to be learnt than one might have thought. This is probably due to the fact that, when it comes to constitutional development, 20 years is actually a brief period. There is room for clarification of many sentencing aspects, but probably none more so than the question about the point at which the legislative authority should hand over the sentencing reigns to the judicial authority. How and when this will happen, only time can tell.
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